








Preprints of the 
Max Planck Institute 








Altruism and charitable giving 









 Preprints of the 
Max Planck Institute 
for Research on Collective Goods  Bonn 2005/8




Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn 
http://www.mpp-rdg.mpg.deAltruism and charitable giving
in a fully replicated economy
Thomas Gaube∗
This version: October 2005
Abstract
In this paper, an economy is analyzed where one group of agents, the
altruists, cares about the well-being of another group of agents, the recipi-
ents. It is asked how changes in the size of these groups aﬀect the altruists’
charitable giving in the Nash equilibrium. I show that a pure group size
eﬀect, i.e., a proportional expansion of both subgroups can lead to less free
riding and to a lower degree of underprovision relative to the eﬃcient level
of charitable giving.
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rdg.mpg.de1 Introduction
In this paper, an economy is analyzed where one group of agents, the altruists,
cares about the well-being of another group of agents, the recipients. It is asked
how changes in the size of these groups aﬀect the altruists’ charitable giving in
the Nash equilibrium. Particular attention is given to the question whether repli-
cations of the whole economy increase or decrease (i) per-capita donations, (ii)
the ratio between contributors and free riders, and (iii) the ratio between the
equilibrium level and the eﬃcient level of charitable giving. This question is mo-
tivated by a closely related topic of the literature, namely the eﬀect of an increase
in group size on private donations to a public good. In this context, it has been
shown by means of the voluntary contribution model of public good provision
that the variables (i), (ii), and (iii) are negatively correlated with group size,
under mild assumptions concerning the individuals’ preferences.1 These ﬁndings
on public good provision thus conﬁrm Olson’s (1965) claim that the free-rider
problem of voluntary donations becomes more severe as group size increases.
The voluntary contribution model of public good provision has been inter-
preted in two diﬀerent ways. First, in the literal sense, namely that a nonrival
commodity like public broadcasting is provided. In terms of this interpretation,
the model relies on the implicit assumption that the individuals contribute to the
public good only because of their personal interest in consuming this commodity.
Hence, altruistic motives play no role. Still, following Becker (1974), the same
model is employed also for investigating altruistically motivated donations. The
proposed analogy between altruistic giving and (selﬁsh) public good provision is
based on the idea that an altruist’s donation to another individual is equivalent
to a public good because the other altruists become better oﬀ as well. Therefore,
the public good model has been used for analyzing any form of private dona-
tions which can broadly be classiﬁed as a contribution to ‘good causes’. From
this perspective, the group-size results of the literature thus suggest that pub-
1Generalizing earlier results by McGuire (1974) and Chamberlin (1974), Andreoni (1988),
and Fries et al. (1991) have shown that the variables (i) and (ii) are negatively correlated
with group size if private consumption and the public good are normal commodities. Gaube
(2001) has pointed out that the additional assumption of gross substitutability between these
commodities is suﬃcient for a negative eﬀect of group size on the variable (iii).
1lic intervention into the market equilibrium for charitable giving becomes more
desirable as group size is increased.
The present paper argues that the comparison between voluntary donations
in a small and a large community may be diﬀerent for the case of altruistically
motivated giving (i.e., charitable giving in the literal sense) than for the case of
selﬁsh donations to a public good. The reasoning is as follows: Consider a com-
munity where a local radio station is ﬁnanced by voluntary donations. If group
size in this community is increased by introducing replicas of each agent, the
agents’ utility from consuming the public good does not change, and all con-
tributors reduce their donations in the Nash equilibrium because they correctly
anticipate that their replicas will contribute to the public good as well. In con-
trast, assume now that a group of altruists supports a group of individuals who
are in need of an expensive medical treatment. Since charitable giving is nonrival
from the altruists’ perspective, the two examples are formally equivalent as long
as a change in group size is modelled by replicating only the group of altruists.
However, if the whole economy is replicated, charitable giving has to be allocated
among a larger number of individuals because the monetary transfers are per-
fectly rival from the recipients’ perspective. Hence, as long as the altruists care
about single individuals and not just about the aggregate donation, they will take
the increased number of recipients into account. Therefore, an increase in group
size may aﬀect charitable giving diﬀerently than a model where the aggregate
donation is nonrival for all agents in the economy suggests.
The subsequent analysis aims to explore the consequences of this argument in
more detail. For that purpose, altruistic preferences are not expressed indirectly
by introducing a public good but directly by assuming that an altruist’s utility
depends on the well-being of each recipient. This framework allows us to investi-
gate how changes in the number of altruists and recipients aﬀect charitable giving
in the Nash equilibrium. It is shown that the altruists’ per-capita donation and
the ratio between contributors and non-contributors can increase in group size
provided that replications of the whole economy are considered. For the case of
additively separable altruistic preferences, a neutrality result is established ac-
cording to which the equilibrium allocation in per-capita terms does not change
if the number of altruists and recipients is increased proportionally. Similar ﬁnd-
2ings are obtained with respect to the ratio between the equilibrium level and the
eﬃcient level of charitable giving: It is shown that this ratio can also increase in
group size and may even converge to unity if the economy becomes suﬃciently
large.
These ﬁndings point out that altruistic charitable giving can react quite dif-
ferently to a change in group size than selﬁsh donations to a public good. As
argued above, the diﬀerence in results stems from the fact that charitable giving
is nonrival only from the altruists’ but not from the recipients’ perspective. In
order to work out this point most clearly, I consider a framework where a strict
separation is made between donors and recipients. The model thus diﬀers from
the setup of linear public good experiments, where monetary transfers among
all participants take place such that givers and recipients are the same persons.
Note, however, that altruism is likely to be relevant in such experiments as well:
Anderson et al. (1998) and Goeree et al. (2002) have shown that altruism can ex-
plain why a non-positive correlation between group size and free riding has been
observed in several public good experiments.2 They argue that a larger group size
gives altruistic participants an incentive to increase their donations because the
number of agents who beneﬁt from these donations is increased.3 The subsequent
analysis makes a similar point. However, I consider only an altruistic link between
the donors and the recipients, not among the donors themselves. Therefore, the
paper does not rely on the idea that the social return of a nonrival commodity
increases with group size, but on the observation that charitable donations are
nonrival only from the altruists’ perspective. In addition, Anderson et al. (1998)
and Goeree et al. (2002) focus on linear payoﬀs and additively separable utility
functions, whereas the present study investigates a nonlinear model, where dona-
tions and private consumption are imperfect substitutes, and where no speciﬁc
utility function is assumed from the outset. Accordingly, interior Nash equilibria
2Isaac and Walker (1988), Isaac et al. (1994), and Goeree et al. (2002) report public good
experiments where group size and free riding are negatively correlated. The empirical ﬁndings of
Lipford (1996), Brunner (1998), and Haan and Kooreman (2002), which deal with contributions
to churches, broadcasting, and candy bars respectively, also raise doubts that the free-rider
problem of voluntary public good provision becomes more severe as more agents enter the
economy.
3This argument is also brieﬂy explored in Andreoni and Miller (2002).
3and interior eﬃcient allocations are analyzed, and it is shown that the speciﬁc
form of altruistic preferences is crucial for answering the question whether group
size and free riding are positively correlated.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. In Section 3, the link between group size, per-capita donations, and free
riding incentives is analyzed. Section 4 deals with the eﬀect of group size on the
ratio between the equilibrium level and the eﬃcient level of charitable giving.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy which consists of two groups of agents, namely I ≥ 1 altru-
ists and K ≥ 1 recipients. The recipients k = 1,...,K have no initial wealth and
rely on monetary transfers bk, which are ﬁnanced by the altruists. It is assumed
that the well-being of each recipient is monotonically increasing in bk. An altruist
of type i ∈ {1,...,I} has monetary endowment ωi > 0, which can be spent for
private consumption xi and charitable giving gi. The sum G of these donations
is allocated among the recipients such that G =
PK
k=1bk. It is assumed that the




which are increasing in xi (˜ Ui
x > 0), non-decreasing in gi (˜ Ui
g ≥ 0), and increasing
in bk (˜ Ui
k > 0), k = 1,...,K, at least for transfers below some threshold ¯ b > 0.
The last of these assumptions means that all types i care about the well-being
of all recipients k. Hence, each transfer bk is a public good from the altruists’
perspective. However, the analysis does not rule out the possibility that altruism
fades away if the transfers bk become suﬃciently large, i.e., if they exceed some
threshold ¯ b.5 The assumption ˜ Ui
g ≥ 0 takes into account that charitable giving
4While the present paper does not intend to explain empirical observations concerning the
private provision of public goods, the subsequent ﬁndings make it clear that the functional form
of the altruists’ utility functions is crucial in this context as well.
5None of the propositions derived below hinge on the assumption that such a threshold exists.
Some of the illustrative examples, however, makes use of the possibility that the altruists’ utility
is increasing in bk only for transfers below some ﬁnite threshold ¯ b.
4may also provide private utility in the sense of Andreoni’s (1990) warm-glow
model of impure altruism. In terms of this model, pure altruists care only about
charitable giving (bk in the present context) and not about their own contribu-
tions gi, whereas impure altruists care about both. Andreoni (1990) and Ribar
and Wilhelm (2002) show that the impure-altruism model is better suited for
explaining observed patterns of charitable giving than the basic voluntary contri-
bution model, where no private motive gi is taken into account. Note, however,
that I do not rule out the case ˜ Ui
g = 0. The subsequent results thus hold in the
absence of a warm-glow eﬀect as well.
In terms of the utility functions (1), a change in the number of recipients
K can be interpreted as a change in the number of public goods. In order to
obtain a framework which is as close as possible to the standard model of a single
privately supplied public good, I will assume that the derivatives ˜ aK
k ( ) of the




















≤ 1, ∀ k,l ∈ {1,...,K}. (2)
These conditions mean that the altruists are either indiﬀerent with respect to
the distribution of the aggregate transfer G =
PK
k=1 bk among the recipients, or
that they prefer an allocation where each recipient obtains the average donation
b := G/K. This can best be interpreted as “anonymity of recipients”: The donors
do not like one speciﬁc recipient more than others. Assumption (2) implies that
we can restrict attention to those allocations where transfers are symmetric, such
that only the average transfer b and the length K of the vector (b1,...,bK) are
relevant for the donors. In order to formalize this property, consider the functions
aK(b,K) := ˜ aK(b1,...,bK)|bk=b ∀k. Because of b = G/K, these functions can be
used to express the donors’ preferences by means of
U
i(xi,gi,G,K) := ˜ U
i(xi,gi,a
K(G/K,K)). (3)
In the following, a change in group size is analyzed by considering replica-
tions of an initial economy that consists of the I ≥ 1 altruists and in which the
number of recipients K is normalized to unity. The subgroup of altruists and the
subgroup of recipients is increased by introducing N − 1 ≥ 0 replicas of each
altruist i ∈ {1,...,I} and K − 1 ≥ 0 replicas of the single recipient, respectively.
5Aggregate charitable giving in an economy with NI altruists thus amounts to
G = N(
PI
i=1 gi). I will distinguish between partial replications of the economy,
where either N or K is changed, and full replications of the economy, where N
and K are increased proportionally such that the initial ratio I between altruists
and recipients remains unaﬀected.
When deciding upon xi and gi, an altruist takes the aggregate provision G−i :=
G − gi of all other altruists as given.6 Since gi and xi have to satisfy the budget
constraint ωi − xi − gi = 0, each altruist maximizes Ui(ωi − gi,gi,G−i + gi,K)
with respect to gi. The ﬁrst-order condition of those agents who choose a strictly








G ≤ 0 for the free riders. In the following, I will assume that
private consumption xi and the marginal utility Ui
G are strictly positive for all
types i in equilibrium.7 These assumptions imply that −Ui
x + Ui
g +Ui
G = 0 holds
for the contributors and that Ui
x > Ui
g holds for all individuals. The contributors’









Accordingly, one obtains mi(ωi,0,G,K) ≤ 1 for the free riders. Maximization
of utility Ui(ωi − gi,gi,G−i + gi,K) with respect to gi leads to the individual’s
reaction function, which can be written in the form
gi = Max{0,fi(ωi + G−i,G−i,K) − G−i}. (5)
Note that (5) is equivalent to the familiar reaction function of the warm-glow
model, except that it depends on the number of recipients K. As in most contri-
butions on voluntary public good provision, the subsequent analysis relies on the
assumption that xi and G are normal goods, and that the ‘demand’ for a warm
glow is non-inferior. As explained in Andreoni (1990), these assumptions mean (i)
6Note that G−i does not only encompass the donations gj of the types j  = i, but also the
donations gi of the other (N − 1) individuals of type i.
7The assumption Ui
G > 0 means that the (impure) altruists are not pure egoists in the sense
of Andreoni (1990); that is, agents who are interested only in ‘private’ consumption xi and gi,
but not in the well-being of the recipients.
6fi
1 > 0, (ii) fi
2 ≥ 0, and (iii) fi
1+fi
2 < 1, where fi
1 and fi
2 are the derivatives of fi( )
with respect to the ﬁrst and the second argument, respectively. The inequalities
(i) - (iii) can be replaced by means of the assumption that the marginal rates of










≤ 0, ∀ i ∈ {1,...,I}. (6)
The normality assumption (6) implies that a unique Nash equilibrium
(gv
1(N,K),...,gv
I(N,K)) exists for any pair of the group-size parameters N and
K.9 Let Cv(N,K) denote the set of contributors, i.e., of those types i who choose
gv
i (N,K) > 0 in an economy with parameters N,K. The number of contribut-
ing types is denoted by #Cv(N,K) ≤ I. The aggregate voluntary contribution,
the per-capita voluntary contribution, and proportion of contributors among the




gv(N,K) := Gv(N,K)/(NI), and cv(N,K) := #Cv(N,K)/I respectively.
Note that a change of the parameters N,K can inﬂuence the individuals’
contributions gv
i (N,K) only if the ﬁrst-order conditions mi(xi,gi,G,K) = 1 for
the contributors or mi(xi,gi,G,K) ≤ 1 for the non-contributors are aﬀected.
Hence, if these inequalities are strict for all types i, i.e., if no altruist chooses an
interior donation gi ∈ ]0,ωi[ in equilibrium, the vector (gv
1(N,K),...,gv
I(N,K))
may not react to small changes of N and K for trivial reasons. In order to avoid
multiple repetitions of this technical qualiﬁcation, I will assume
∃ i ∈ {1,...,I} : 0 < g
v
i (N,K) < ωi (7)
8It is straightforward to show that the inequalities (i)-(iii) follow from (6). It can also easily
be established that (i)-(iii) lead to (∂mi/∂G)(∂mi/∂xi) ≤ 0 and (∂mi/∂gi)(∂mi/∂xi) ≤ 0.
These inequalities imply (6) because utility is strictly quasiconcave. Note that Ui
g = 0 and
∂mi/∂gi = 0 must hold if no warm-glow eﬀect takes place. In this case, the ﬁrst two inequalities









which stand for normality of G and xi respectively (see, e.g., Buchholz and Peters (2001), p.
65).
9Consider the slope ∂gi/∂G−i of the reaction function (5). As noted above, assumption (6)
leads to the inequalities (i) - (iii), which in turn imply 0 > ∂gi/∂G−i > −1 for gi > 0, and
∂gi/∂G−i = 0 for gi = 0. Andreoni (1990) notes that these properties are suﬃcient for existence
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. A formal proof of this claim can be found in Cornes
et al. (1999).
7from the outset. This assumption implies that mi(xi,gi,G,K) = 1 holds for
at least one type i ∈ Cv(N,K), but it does not require that a speciﬁc type
i ∈ {1,...,I} is a contributor irrespective of N and K.
In terms of positive analysis, the link between group size and free riding is
usually discussed by means of the variables gv( ) and cv( ). From a normative per-
spective, however, the comparison between the equilibrium provision Gv(N,K)
and eﬃcient charitable giving G∗(N,K) is of interest as well. Therefore, an ef-
ﬁciency benchmark has to be determined. In the following, eﬃcient allocations




mi(xi,gi,G,K) = 1. (8)
Two comments with respect to this condition are in order. First, note that each
allocation which satisﬁes (8) may correspond to a diﬀerent provision level G∗( ).
Therefore, one of these allocations has to be chosen. Following the analysis in
Gaube (2001), I will employ the Lindahl allocation as a reference point for eﬃcient
charitable giving.10 In the present context, the Lindahl equilibrium is deﬁned as
follows: The agents of type i = 1,...,I maximize utility Ui(xi,gi,G,K) subject to
the budget constraint ωi −xi −piG ≥ 0, where pi is the personalized price of the
public good. In addition, they take into account that their personal contribution
to the public good equals gi = piG. In this way, the demand functions xi(pi,ωi,K)
and Gi(pi,ωi,K) are obtained. In equilibrium, the conditions G1( ) = G2( ) =
... = GI( ) and N
PI
i=1 pi = 1 have to be satisﬁed. Accordingly, the eﬃcient
provision level is deﬁned by means of G∗(N,K) := Gi(p∗
i(N,K),ωi,K), where
p∗
i(N,K) is the Lindahl price for the agents of type i ∈ {1,...,I}.
It should be noted also that the Samuelson condition (8) takes only the utility
of the altruists, but not of the recipients into account. Clearly, a Pareto improve-
ment among the recipients can be obtained if and only if the aggregate transfer
G =
PK
k=1bk is increased. Hence, if we consider an allocation where the inequal-
ity N
PI
i=1 mi(xi,gi,G,K) > 1 holds, an increase in G can be used to make all
10This reference point will be used for investigating the index of easy riding Gv( )/G∗( )
introduced by Cornes and Sandler (1984, 1996). Their analysis deals with identical agents and
deﬁnes the ratio Gv( )/G∗( ) by means of the symmetric eﬃcient allocation. With identical
agents, the Lindahl allocation and the symmetric eﬃcient allocation coincide.
8types i = 1,...,I and all agents k = 1,...,K better oﬀ. However, allocations with
N
PI
i=1 mi(xi,gi,G,K) < 1 can also be Pareto eﬃcient from the perspective of
the whole economy because a reduction in G necessarily harms at least one of the
recipients k ∈ {1,...,K}. In the present context, the quantity G∗(N,K) should
thus be interpreted as the minimal amount of Pareto eﬃcient charitable giving.11
Therefore, I use the term “eﬃcient provision” and do not refer to the Pareto
concept.
3 Free riding and easy riding
This section is devoted to the question of how changes in group size aﬀect the
proportion of contributors cv(N,K) and the per-capita contribution gv(N,K)
in the Nash equilibrium. For the voluntary contribution model of public good
provision, where it is assumed that the preferences of all agents can be expressed
by means of utility functions Ui(xi,G), this topic has been analyzed, for example,
in Fries et al. (1991). They show that the proportion of contributing agents and
the per-capita contribution are weakly decreasing in group size.12 Hence, free-
riding tendencies in the literal and in ﬁgurative sense (i.e., easy riding in the
terminology of Cornes and Sandler, 1996) are exacerbated if more agents enter
the economy. In the following, I will show that these ﬁndings do not hold in
the present model if replications of the whole economy are considered and if the
altruists do not only care about aggregate giving, but about the well-being of
single individuals.
The altruists’ utility functions (3) diﬀer from the utility functions Ui(xi,G) of
the public good model in two ways. First, a private motive gi of charitable giving is
taken into account. Second, the additional group size parameter K is introduced.
Note that the warm-glow eﬀect gi only ameliorates but does not abolish the
11In fact, for preferences where the rule (8) leads to a unique amount G∗(N,K) (see Bergstrom
and Cornes (1983) for a characterization of these preferences in the absence of a warm-
glow eﬀect), any provision level G between G∗(N,K) and the altruists’ aggregate endowment
N
PI
i=1 ωi is Pareto eﬃcient whereas allocations with G < G∗(N,K) are Pareto ineﬃcient.
12Similar ﬁndings can be found in McGuire (1974), Chamberlin (1974), and Andreoni (1988).
The paper by Fries et al. (1991) is closest to the present analysis because it also models a change
in group size by replicating an initial economy with heterogeneous individuals.
9altruists’ incentive for free riding if new replicas enter the economy. This means
that the results of the literature should also hold in the present model as long as
only a partial replication of the economy, namely of the subgroup of altruists, is
considered. The following preliminary ﬁnding shows that this is indeed the case.
The proofs of all propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1: The per-capita contribution gv(N,K) is decreasing and the pro-
portion of contributors cv(N,K) is weakly decreasing in N.
Proposition 1 extends the analysis of Fries et al. (1991) by pointing out that
gv(N,K) and cv(N,K) are also (weakly) decreasing in the number of potential
donors NI if some private, non-altruistic motive Ui( ,gi, ) of charitable giving
is taken into account. Clearly, this result also holds for a proportional increase
in N and K provided that the functions Ui(xi,gi,G,K) do not depend on K. In
this case, the altruists care only about the aggregate transfer G, such that the
number of potential recipients K becomes irrelevant for the amount of charitable
giving. In terms of the altruistic preferences (1), this assumption corresponds to
the special case13
˜ Ui(xi,gi,˜ aK(b1,...,bK)) = ˜ Ui(xi,gi,
PK
k=1bk). (9)
In fact, with preferences of the form (9), the utility functions Ui(xi,gi,G,K) are
independent of K.14 This means that the present model becomes equivalent to
the standard speciﬁcation with utility Ui(xi,gi,G), where a change in K has no
eﬀect on charitable giving Gv(N,K). Not surprisingly, the same results as in this
literature are thus obtained. This observation can be summarized by means of
Corollary 1: Consider altruistic preferences of the form (9). Then gv(N,K) and
cv(N,K) do not depend on the number of recipients K. Accordingly, gv(N,N) is
decreasing and cv(N,N) is weakly decreasing in N.
13Example (9) and the subsequent examples (10), (11), and (13) are expressed in terms of
the utility function (1), which forms the starting point of the present investigation. In this way,
the reader can verify that these examples do not violate the symmetry assumption (2), which
in turn implies that the simpler utility function (3) can indeed be used in the formal analysis.
14In example (9), we have ˜ aK(b1,...,bK) =
PK
k=1 bk, which implies aK(b,K) = Kb and
aK(G/K,K) = G. Hence, the functions Ui( ) do not depend on the number of recipients K.
10As pointed out in the introductory section, the argument that charitable giv-
ing is a nonrival commodity from the altruists’ perspective led to the idea that
altruistic donations can be analyzed in the same way as voluntary donations to
a public good. From this perspective, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 show that
the results about group size of the theoretical literature on voluntary public good
provision can be interpreted in terms of the present model in two diﬀerent ways:
ﬁrst, as a thought experiment where only the number of altruists is changed such
that an increase in group size simultaneously leads to a higher ratio between the
number of altruists and recipients; second, as an implicit assumption concerning
altruistic preferences, namely the hypothesis that the donors take only the ag-
gregate transfer G =
PK
k=1 bk into account and do not care about the number K
of individuals among which these donations have to be allocated.
In the following, an increase in group size is identiﬁed with replications of the
whole economy. Therefore, I will concentrate on the question whether the ﬁndings
of Corollary 1 may change if preferences diﬀerent from those in example (9) are
taken into consideration.15 Note that a result diﬀering from that in Corollary 1 can
only be obtained if an isolated increase in K increases the per-capita contribution
gv(N,K) in the Nash equilibrium. A suﬃcient condition for this property is that
each agent’s demand for the public good increases in K. Due to the ﬁrst-order
conditions (4), the latter property holds if the marginal rates of substitution
mi(xi,gi,G,K) between public and private consumption are increasing in K for
all types i. However, since a replication of the whole economy increases the per-
capita contribution gv(N,K) only if the positive eﬀect of K over-compensates
the negative eﬀect of N, a stronger assumption has to be made. The following
result shows that a proportional increase in the number of altruists and recipients
weakly increases gv(N,K), as long as the marginal rates of substitution
ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) := mi(xi,gi,bK,K) = mi(xi,gi,G,K)
between private consumption and the per-capita transfer b are weakly increasing
in K. Note that the deﬁnition of ˆ mi( ) makes use of the relationship bK = G.
15Abrams and Schmitz (1984) provide evidence that the number of potential recipients has a
positive eﬀect on charitable giving. This result suggests that other preferences than in (9) are
relevant from an empirical point of view.
11Hence, the assumption ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K + 1) ≥ ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) is stronger than the
assumption mi(xi,gi,G,K + 1) ≥ mi(xi,gi,G,K) because the marginal rates of
substitution mi(xi,gi,G,K) are assumed to be decreasing in G.
Proposition 2: (a) If the marginal rates of substitution ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are inde-
pendent of K for all types i ∈ {1,...,I}, gv(N,N) and cv(N,N) are independent
of N. (b) If the marginal rates of substitution ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are increasing (de-
creasing) in K for all types i ∈ {1,...,I}, gv(N,N) is increasing (decreasing) in
N.
For the intuition behind this ﬁnding, consider the case where the functions
ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are increasing in K. Assume now that K and N are increased
to K + 1 and N + 1 respectively, and that the additional altruist of each type i
imitates the existing altruists by choosing the same initial contribution gv
i (N,K).
This implies that the aggregate donation G increases, whereas xi,gi, and b remain
constant for all individuals. However, in this situation the contributing types
have an incentive to increase their initial contribution gv
i (N,K) > 0 because the
change in K has increased their marginal rates of substitution ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) ≥ 1
between the per-capita transfer b and ‘private’ consumption (xi,gi). Therefore, a
full replication of the economy leads to a higher per-capita contribution gv(N,K).
Proposition 2 shows that the per-capita contribution gv(N,N) in the Nash
equilibrium is increasing or decreasing in N if each agent’s marginal rate of sub-
stitution ˆ mi( ) is increasing or decreasing in K. Clearly, these conditions are only
suﬃcient, but not necessary, for the result. It should be noted that this quali-
ﬁcation applies to the subsequent ﬁndings as well. In fact, the present analysis
concentrates on the case where all altruists have similar preferences; it does not
deal with situations where ˆ mi( ) is decreasing in K for some group of altruists
and increasing in K for another group of altruists. In such a situation, the eﬀect
of a change in group size depends on the ratio between the donations from these
groups, which in turn changes with group size such that general results can hardly
be obtained.
Proposition 2 relies on three distinct assumptions concerning the eﬀect of the
number of recipients K on the marginal rates of substitution ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K). This
raises the question of the assumptions concerning the altruistic preferences (1)
under which these three cases are obtained. For a clariﬁcation of this point, con-
12sider the benchmark case of group-size neutrality, where a full replication of the
initial economy has no eﬀect on the per-capita allocation (xi,gi,b). According to
Proposition 2, this property holds if the functions ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are independent
of K. This assumption means that the donors’ incentive to transfer money to the
recipients does not change with an increase in K as long as all recipients obtain
the same transfer b as before. The latter property corresponds to preferences for
which an additively separable utility representation
˜ Ui(xi,gi,˜ aK(b1,...,bK)) = ui(xi,gi) +
PK
k=1 fi(bk) (10)
exists. In fact, with preferences of the form (10), we get Ui(xi,gi,G,K) =
ui(xi,gi) + Kfi(G/K).16 It can easily be veriﬁed that these utility functions
imply ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K +1) = ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) for any K ≥ 1. Because of Proposition
2, we thus obtain
Corollary 2: Consider altruistic preferences of the form (10). Then gv(N,N)
and cv(N,N) are independent of N.
For the intuition behind Corollary 2, consider the initial economy where I
altruists care about a single recipient k = 1. With preferences of the form (10), the
altruists’ marginal rates of substitution ˜ Ui
1/(˜ Ui
x− ˜ Ui
g) between the transfer b1 and
private consumption do not change if a second recipient k = 2 enters the economy.
Hence, their donations remain constant provided that the new altruists behave
equivalently by ﬁnancing the same donation b2 = b1 for the recipient k = 2.
In contrast to example (9), where the altruists care only about the aggregate
transfer G, the donations of the new donors thus do not crowd out those of the
initial altruists. Therefore, the positive eﬀect of K on the per-capita contribution
gv(N,K) precisely cancels out the negative eﬀect of an increase in N.
The Corollaries 1 and 2 refer to altruistic preferences (1), where the functions
ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are decreasing in K or independent of K, respectively. In the
following, I will show that the marginal rates of substitution ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) can
be increasing in K as well. For an illustration, consider the example discussed in
16In example (10), we have ˜ aK(b1,...,bK) =
PK
k=1 fi(bk), which implies aK(b,K) = Kfi(b)
and aK(G/K,K) = Kfi(G/K). Therefore, Ui(xi,gi,G,K) = ui(xi,gi) + Kfi(G/K). Note
that assumption (6) can be satisﬁed only if the functions fi( ) are strictly concave. Therefore,
example (10) rules out preferences of the form (9).
13the introductory section: Assume that the number T ≥ 0 of those agents who
cannot aﬀord the cost z of a medical treatment generates a negative externality
upon the altruists. In the absence of charitable giving, T equals the number of
recipients K. Private donations G ≤ Kz reduce this number to T = K − G/z,
which can equivalently be expressed by means of T =
PK
k=1(1 − bk/z). In terms




˜ Ui(xi,gi,˜ aK(b1,...,bK)) = ˜ Ui(xi,gi,
PK
k=1(1 − bk/z)) (11)
are decreasing in ˜ aK( ). With preferences of type (11), the marginal rates of
substitution ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are increasing in K. Due to Proposition 2, the per-
capita contribution gv(N,N) is thus increasing in N. Moreover, the special case
(11) also implies that the proportion of contributors cv(N,N) is non-decreasing
in N. These ﬁndings are established in the Appendix and can be summarized by
means of
Corollary 3: Consider altruistic preferences of the form (11). Then gv(N,N) is
increasing and cv(N,N) is weakly increasing in N.
For the intuition behind Corollary 3, consider again a situation where K,N,
and G are increased proportionally such that the average transfer b does not
change. This implies that the percentage T/K = 1 − b/z of those individuals
who remain without treatment is kept constant. Hence, the absolute amount T
of these agents is increased. Since the negative externality depends on T, the
altruists thus have an incentive to further increase their donation. Therefore, the
per-capita contribution and the proportion of contributors among the altruists
are (weakly) increasing if the whole economy is replicated.
Example (11) serves as an illustration for Proposition 2, where it is shown that
the per-capita contribution gv(N,N) is increasing in N if the altruists’ marginal
rates of substitution ˆ mi( ) are increasing in K. This condition can be expressed






which imply that the marginal utility of (altruistic) charitable giving Ui
G depends
only on G and K, and that Ui
x and Ui
g depend only on xi and gi. Let ǫi
G and
14ǫi
K denote the elasticities of the function Ui
G(G,K) with respect to G and K
respectively. It can easily be veriﬁed by means of (12) that the marginal rate
of substitution ˆ mi( ) is increasing in K if and only if ǫi
K + ǫi
G > 0. Hence, the
per-capita contribution gv(N,N) is increasing in N if a one-percent increase in
the number of recipients K increases the donors’ marginal utility from charitable
giving to a larger extent than it is decreased by a one-percent increase in chari-
table giving G. If this condition holds, the donors become more inclined towards
charitable giving as the number of recipients is increased, even if the per-capita
transfer does not change. Note that example (11) - where the altruists care about
the number of agents who cannot aﬀord a certain standard of medical treatment
(or of other needs like nutrition, shelter and education) - is just one possibility for
illustrating such a situation. In fact, based on the elasticity argument presented
above, other examples can easily be constructed.17
4 The index of easy riding
The three examples which have been discussed in Section 3 illustrate diﬀerent
assumptions concerning the eﬀect of a change in the number of recipients K on
the altruists’ preferences for private consumption and charitable giving. Clearly,
this eﬀect is relevant also for the relationship between group size and the eﬃcient
level of charitable giving. Therefore, the results of Section 3 do not clarify whether
the deﬁciencies of the Nash equilibrium relative to an eﬃcient allocation become
more or less severe as group size is increased. In the following, this issue will be
discussed.
In the present context, ineﬃciency of the Nash equilibrium means that all
altruists and all recipients can be made better oﬀ if charitable giving is in-
creased above the equilibrium level Gv(N,K). This property corresponds to the
observation that the eﬃcient provision level G∗(N,K) in the Lindahl equilib-
rium exceeds Gv(N,K) for economies with at least two altruists.18 We thus
17Consider, for example, the function aK(G/K,K) = (G/K)αKβ. Assuming (12) and 0 <
α < 1, it can be shown that ˆ mi( ) is increasing in K (i.e., that ǫi
K +ǫi
G > 0) if and only if β > 1.
18 As shown in Buchholz and Peters (2001) for the voluntary contribution model of public
good provision (i.e., for preferences Ui(xi,G)), eﬃcient provision G∗( ) in the Lindahl equi-
15have Gv( )/G∗( ) < 1, provided that NI ≥ 2. This property is equivalent to
gv( )/g∗( ) < 1, where g∗(N,K) := G∗(N,K)/(NI) is the altruists’ per-capita
donation in the Lindahl equilibrium. In the theoretical and experimental litera-




is usually employed as a measure of underprovision. Following the terminology
of Cornes and Sandler (1984,1996), I will refer to this ratio as the index of easy
riding. The subsequent analysis investigates how full replications of the initial
economy aﬀect e(N,K) for the case of altruistic charitable giving.
In the voluntary contribution model of public good provision where utility
functions Ui(xi,G) are assumed, group size and free riding tendencies are pos-
itively correlated (see Proposition 1). Hence, intuition suggests that the index
of easy riding should decrease in this model as the economy becomes larger.
However, neither a general proof of this claim nor a counterexample is avail-
able. Therefore, the literature has concentrated on examples where Ui(xi,G) is
either quasilinear or Cobb-Douglas (see Sandler 1992, Chapter 7, for a critical
discussion). The Cobb-Douglas example has been generalized in Gaube (2001) by
showing that the index of easy riding decreases in group size, provided that the
commodities xi and G are strictly normal and weak gross substitutes. Since the
assumption of strict normality is crucial for uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
and has also been employed in Section 3, I will use this ﬁnding as a reference
point for the subsequent analysis.
Before investigating the ratio gv( )/g∗( ), consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of an isolated
increase in N and a proportional increase in N and K on the eﬃcient per-capita
donation g∗(N,K): The commodities xi and G are weak gross substitutes for
an agent of type i, as long as the demand function xi(pi,ωi,K) in the Lindahl
economy is non-decreasing in the personalized price pi of the public good. In
analogy to Lemma 2 of Gaube (2001), part (a) of the following Proposition 3
points out that this assumption is suﬃcient for obtaining a positive relationship
between the per-capita contribution g∗(N,K) in the Lindahl equilibrium and
librium always exceeds the equilibrium provision Gv( ). Using the same argument as in their
paper, it can be shown that G∗(N,K) > Gv(N,K) holds in the present context as well.
16the group size parameter N. In contrast, part (b) of Proposition 3 refers to a
proportional increase in N and K. Similar to Proposition 2, it is shown that
g∗(N,N) is increasing in N, as long as an additional recipient has a non-negative
eﬀect on the marginal rates of substitution ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K).
Proposition 3: (a) If public and private consumption are weak gross substitutes
for all types i ∈ {1,...,I}, g∗(N,K) is weakly increasing in N.
(b) If the functions ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are weakly increasing in K for all types i ∈
{1,...,I}, g∗(N,N) is increasing in N.
Consider ﬁrst part (a) of Proposition 3. The following intuition lies behind
this ﬁnding: Since an increase in the number of altruists decreases the Lindahl
prices p∗
i(N,K), the individuals’ contributions piG = ωi−xi are weakly increasing
in N, as long as the functions xi(pi,ωi,K) are weakly increasing in pi. Because
of Proposition 1, the gross-substitutes assumption thus implies that the index
of easy riding e(N,K) is decreasing in N. Clearly, this ﬁnding also holds for a
proportional increase in N and K, provided that an isolated change of K does
not aﬀect g∗(N,K) and gv(N,K) respectively. The latter property holds if the
utility functions Ui(xi,gi,G,K) are independent of K, i.e., if preferences can be
described by means of example (9). In this case, Corollary 1 and Proposition 3
thus imply
Corollary 4: Consider altruistic preferences of the form (9) and assume that
public and private consumption are weak gross substitutes for all types i = 1,...,I.
Then the index of easy riding e(N,N) is decreasing in N.
With altruistic preferences of type (9), the present model is equivalent to the
public good model Ui(xi,G) because a replication of the group of altruists has
the same eﬀect on charitable giving as a replication of the whole economy. In
analogy to Corollary 1, Corollary 4 thus serves as a reference point for investigat-
ing the potential diﬀerences between non-altruistic public good provision and an
altruistic motive for charitable giving. For that purpose, I will compare Corollary
4 with examples (10) and (11) of Section 3 where, in contrast to example (9), an
increase in the number of recipients K has a positive eﬀect on the equilibrium
provision level gv(N,K) and the eﬃcient provision level g∗(N,K).
Consider ﬁrst example (10). Part (b) of Proposition 3 points out that g∗(N,N)
17is increasing in N if the eﬀect of K on the marginal rates of substitution
mi(xi,gi,G,K) is suﬃciently strong such that the functions ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are
weakly increasing in K as well. Combining this result with part (a) of Proposition
2, it becomes clear that the ratio gv(N,N)/g∗(N,N) is decreasing in N, as long
as the marginal rates of substitution ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are independent of K. Since
this property holds as long as altruistic preferences are of the additively separable
form (10), we can state
Corollary 5: Consider altruistic preferences of the form (10). Then e(N,N) is
decreasing in N.
The per-capita donations gv(N,K) and g∗(N,K) are increasing in K for the
preferences (10), but are independent of K for the preferences (9). The comparison
between these examples thus shows that a positive eﬀect of K on charitable giving
gv(N,K) does not imply a lower degree of underprovision relative to the eﬃcient
level g∗(N,K) because the latter increases in K as well. In fact, since Corollary 5
also holds if the gross-substitutes assumption is violated, example (10) makes a
stronger point than example (9) for the claim that the eﬃciency measure e(N,N)
is decreasing in group size. Still, the subsequent analysis points out that group
size and the index of easy riding can also be positively correlated in the present
context. This will be illustrated by means of example (11).
In examples (9) and (10) the marginal rates of substitution ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are
non-increasing in K. In these examples, underprovision becomes more severe as
group size increases. Consider now a situation where the functions ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K)
are increasing in K. According to Propositions 2 and 3, this implies that gv(N,N)
and g∗(N,N) are increasing in N. Note that g∗(N,N) cannot exceed the altru-
ists’ average endowment ¯ ω := (
PI
i=1 ωi)/I, which means that is has to converge
to some upper bound ¯ g ≤ ¯ ω. Hence, as long as the positive eﬀect of N on
the equilibrium level gv(N,N) is not arbitrarily small, the index of easy riding
e(N,N) must increase in group size at least for some N. The following proposi-
tion shows that e(N,N) can even converge to unity if the positive eﬀect of K on
the marginal rates of substitution ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) does not vanish as K converges
to inﬁnity. This is formalized by means of the assumption that one can always
ﬁnd some number ˜ K ≥ 1 such that ˆ mi(¯ xi,¯ gi,¯ b, ˜ K) exceeds unity provided that
ˆ mi(¯ xi,¯ gi,¯ b,1) is positive, and provided that the allocation (¯ xi,¯ gi,¯ b) is consistent
18with the altruists’ budget constraints. Intuitively, this assumption means that,
for a constant per-capita transfer b, an increase in K does not only increase the
marginal utility of charitable giving Ui
G, but that this eﬀect is in principle un-
bounded, i.e., that Ui
G grows without bounds as K converges to inﬁnity. Under
this assumption, the donors become gradually more inclined towards voluntary
charitable giving as group size is increased, such that the diﬀerence between vol-
untary donations Gv(N,N) and eﬃcient donations G∗(N,N) remains ﬁnite in
a large economy. Accordingly, the diﬀerence between the per-capita donations
gv(N,N) and g∗(N,N) becomes arbitrarily small as N converges to inﬁnity.
Proposition 4: Assume that the functions ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are increasing in K for
all types i ∈ {1,...,I} and that limK→∞ ˆ mi(¯ xi,¯ gi,¯ b,K) > 1 holds for all (¯ xi,¯ gi,¯ b)
which satisfy the condition 0 < ˆ mi(¯ xi,¯ gi,¯ b, ¯ K) ≤ 1, where ¯ xi+¯ gi = ωi and ¯ K = 1.
Then e(N,N) is increasing in N at least for some N ≥ 1, and it converges to
unity as N converges to inﬁnity.
The following formal reasoning is behind Proposition 4: Consider the case I =
1, which means that all altruists are identical and that their Lindahl prices equal
1/N. Hence, an allocation (¯ xi, ¯ gi,¯ b) is the Lindahl equilibrium of an economy
with parameters ¯ N = ¯ K ≥ 2, provided that ˆ mi(¯ xi, ¯ gi,¯ b, ¯ K) = 1/ ¯ N. Because of
the ﬁrst-order conditions (4), the same vector (¯ xi,¯ gi,¯ b) is also a Nash equilibrium
in an economy with parameters ˜ N = ˜ K, as long as ˆ mi(¯ xi,¯ gi,¯ b, ˜ K) = 1. The
assumption limK→∞ ˆ mi(¯ xi,¯ gi,¯ b,K) > 1 of Proposition 4 thus implies that any
allocation (¯ xi,¯ gi,¯ b) that is eﬃcient in the ¯ N- ¯ K-economy can be implemented as
a Nash equilibrium if the corresponding group size ˜ K = ˜ N becomes suﬃciently
large. Therefore, gv(N,N) and g∗(N,N) must converge to the same upper bound
¯ g ≤ ¯ ω as group size N converges to inﬁnity. Accordingly, the index of easy riding
e(N,N) converges to unity, which means that it cannot decrease in group size for
any N ≥ 1.
For an example of preferences which are in line with the assumptions of Propo-
sition 4, consider a special case of the utility functions (11), namely




, α > 1. (13)
Because of
PK
k=1(1 − bk/z) = K − G/z, example (13) implies Ui(xi,gi,G,K) =
ui(xi,gi)−(K −G/z)α. It can easily be veriﬁed that this functional form satisﬁes
19the assumptions of Proposition 4.19 We can thus state
Corollary 6: Consider altruistic preferences of the form (13). Then e(N,N) is
increasing in N at least for some N ≥ 1, and it converges to unity as N converges
to inﬁnity.
For the intuition behind Corollary 6, consider the interpretation of example
(11) in Section 3, where the term T = K − G/z stands for the number of agents
who remain without medical treatment. In example (13), this number aﬀects the
marginal utility of charitable giving by means of the formula Ui
G = (α/z)T α−1.
The important point about this formula is that it converges to inﬁnity as T con-
verges to inﬁnity. Assume now for simplicity that the altruists’ endowments are
suﬃciently high relative to the per-capita cost of medical treatment z such that
the donors’ marginal utility from private consumption Ui
x is ﬁnite even if aggre-
gate donations cover the maximum total cost zK.20 Then the marginal utility Ui
G
and the number T must be ﬁnite in the Nash equilibrium as well. In other words,
since the altruists suﬀer from T, voluntary donations keep this number ﬁnite even
if the number of potential recipients grows to inﬁnity. Accordingly, the diﬀerence
between equilibrium provision Gv(N,N) and eﬃcient provision G∗(N,N) must
also be ﬁnite, which in turn implies that the diﬀerence between the per-capita
contributions g∗(N,N) and gv(N,N) converges to zero as group size converges
to inﬁnity.
Proposition 4 and Corollary 6 stand in stark contrast to the widespread claim
that the free-rider problem of voluntary charitable giving becomes more severe as
group size is increased. Note, however, that the ﬁndings rely on a thought exper-
iment where it is assumed that the economy’s size N = K grows to inﬁnity. This
raises the question whether a positive relationship between group size and the
index of easy riding e(N,N) can also be established for a small group of agents.
In order to show that this is indeed the case, consider an economy with a single
19The utility function Ui(xi,gi,G,K) = ui(xi,gi) − (K − G/z)α leads to mi(xi,gi,G,K) =
α[(K −G/z)α−1/(ui
x−ui
g)], which in turn implies ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) = αKα−1[(1−b/z)α−1/(ui
x−
ui
g)]. Hence, ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) is increasing in K and exceeds unity for any vector (¯ xi,¯ gi,¯ b), as
deﬁned in Proposition 4, provided that K becomes suﬃciently large.
20Note that Corollary 6 does not rely on this assumption. It is used here only for clarifying
the main argument behind the result.
20type of donor, i.e., I = 1. This assumption means that we have only one altruist
in the initial economy of size N = K = 1. Since no positive externality among
the altruists can be generated in this case, an eﬃcient allocation is obtained such
that e(1,1) = 1. With at least two altruists, however, voluntary contributions
are ineﬃciently low (see fn. 18). Therefore, the inequality e(2,2) < e(1,1) holds
generally with a single type of donor. Assume now that the altruists’ preferences
can be described by a utility function of the form (13), and consider the example
ui(xi,gi) = lnxi+δ lngi, where δ ≥ 0. A numerical analysis of this example shows
that the graph of the function e(N,N) is U-shaped, i.e., that e(N,N) decreases
in N for all N below some threshold ¯ N ≥ 2 and increases in N for all N ≥ ¯ N.21
Depending on the parameters α,δ,z and the donors’ endowment ωi, any thresh-
old value ¯ N ≥ 2 can be generated. Hence, the index of easy riding e(N,N) can
increase in N, even for small groups with N ≥ 3 altruists and recipients.
5 Conclusion
The present paper relies on the presumption that the comparison between chari-
table giving in a small and a large community should take into account that the
same group structure is investigated in both cases only if the number of potential
donors and the number of potential recipients is changed proportionally. There-
fore, a model is introduced where altruistic motives are expressed in terms of
utility interdependence, such that the eﬀect of an increase in the size of each sub-
group can be analyzed. It is shown that this model is equivalent to the voluntary
contribution model of public good provision, provided that a speciﬁc structure of
altruistic preferences is assumed. In this case, the main results of the literature
are conﬁrmed, namely that an increase in group size leads to a decrease in (i)
per-capita contributions, (ii) the ratio between contributors and free riders, and
(iii) the ratio between the equilibrium level and the eﬃcient level of public good
21The argument presented above makes it clear that the index of easy riding must decrease in
group size at least for the smallest possible group with a single altruist. Under the assumptions of
Proposition 4, the index must also increase in group size for very large groups. Note, however,
that these two ﬁndings do not imply that the function e(N,N) is U-shaped. The numerical
example discussed in the text thus illustrates a possible functional form, which by no means
follows from the assumptions made in Proposition 4.
21provision. However, if the altruists care not just about the aggregate donation,
but also about the number of potential recipients, each of these variables can be
positively correlated with group size. Hence, the free rider problem of voluntary
charitable giving may not become worse as group size is increased because mon-
etary transfers are equivalent to a public good only from the altruists’, but not
from the recipients’ perspective.
The model presented in Section 2 provides a theoretical framework for analyz-
ing the link between group size and charitable giving, which does not presume a
speciﬁc functional form of altruistic preferences from the outset. In this way, it is
pointed out by means of examples (9) - (13) that the form of altruistic preferences
is crucial for answering the question whether an increase in group size alleviates
or exacerbates the free-rider problem of charitable giving. However, the analysis
does not clarify which type of preferences is most relevant from an empirical point
of view. To my knowledge, neither empirical nor experimental results are available
that refer to the eﬀect of group size on purely altruistic donations, i.e., voluntary
contributions where, like in the dictator game, the donors’ private interest in con-
suming the aggregate donation is ruled out by assumption.22 Therefore, further
research is required in order to shed light on the question whether real-world
altruistic preferences imply that private charitable giving becomes more (or less)
eﬃcient as group size is increased.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the Nash equilibrium in two economies with parameters ( ˜ N,K) and
( ¯ N,K), respectively where ¯ N = ˜ N +1 and K ≥ 1. In order to simplify the nota-
tion, deﬁne ˜ gi := gv
i ( ˜ N,K), ˜ xi := ωi−˜ gi, ˜ g := gv( ˜ N,K), and ˜ G := Gv( ˜ N,K). The
equilibrium allocation ¯ gi, ¯ xi,¯ g, ¯ G for the ¯ N-K-economy is deﬁned analogously. As-
sume now that gv(N,K) is not decreasing in N, i.e., that ¯ g ≥ ˜ g. This implies
¯ G > ˜ G. Due to assumption (6), we thus have mi(˜ xi,˜ gi, ¯ G,K) < mi(˜ xi,˜ gi, ˜ G,K).
22In fact, the diﬀerent cases analyzed in Sections 3 and 4 could be investigated experimentally
by comparing the donations in (multiperson) dictator games with diﬀerent numbers of potential
donors and recipients.
22Because of the ﬁrst-order conditions (4), this implies ¯ gi = ˜ gi = 0 for all types
i  ∈ Cv( ˜ N,K) and ¯ gi ≤ ˜ gi for all types i ∈ Cv( ˜ N,K), where the strict inequality
holds provided that 0 < ˜ gi < ωi. Due to assumption (7), we thus have ¯ g < ˜ g,
which contradicts the initial claim ¯ g ≥ ˜ g. Therefore, gv(N,K) is decreasing in N.
The result ¯ g < ˜ g implies ¯ gj < ˜ gj for at least some type j ∈ {1,...,I}. Be-
cause of the ﬁrst-order conditions (4), this can hold only if mj(˜ xj, ˜ gj, ¯ G,K) <
mj(˜ xj,˜ gj, ˜ G,K). Since mj( ) is decreasing in G, we thus have ¯ G > ˜ G. Using the
ﬁrst-order conditions (4) for the types i  = j as well, the property ¯ G > ˜ G leads to
¯ gi ≤ ˜ gi for all i  = j. Therefore, cv(N,K) is weakly decreasing in N.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the Nash equilibrium in two economies with parameters ˜ N = ˜ K and
¯ N = ¯ K = ˜ N + 1 respectively. In order to simplify the notation, deﬁne ˜ gi :=
gv
i ( ˜ N, ˜ N), ˜ xi := ωi − ˜ gi, ˜ g := gv( ˜ N, ˜ N), ˜ G := Gv( ˜ N, ˜ N), and ˜ b := ˜ G/ ˜ K. The
equilibrium allocation ¯ gi, ¯ xi,¯ g, ¯ G,¯ b for the ¯ N- ¯ K-economy is deﬁned analogously.
(a) Note that ¯ gi = ˜ gi, i = 1,...,I implies ¯ xi = ˜ xi, ¯ g = ˜ g, and ¯ b =
˜ b. Since it is assumed that the functions ˆ mi( ) do not depend on K, we
also have ˆ mi(˜ xi,˜ gi,˜ b, ¯ K) = ˆ mi(˜ xi,˜ gi,˜ b, ˜ K). Hence, the ﬁrst-order conditions
ˆ mi(˜ xi,˜ gi,˜ b, ˜ K) = mi(˜ xi,˜ gi, ˜ G, ˜ K) ≥ (≤)1 for the contributors (non-contributors)
in the ˜ N- ˜ K-economy hold for the ¯ N- ¯ K-economy as well. The vector (˜ g1,˜ g2,...,˜ gI)
is thus a Nash equilibrium in both economies. Therefore, gv(N,N) and cv(N,N)
are independent of N.
(b) In the following, I will only show that ¯ g > ˜ g holds as long as the functions
ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are increasing in K. The proof of the opposite case is equivalent.
Note ﬁrst that we have ∂ ˆ mi( )/∂xi = ∂mi( )/∂xi, ∂ ˆ mi( )/∂gi = ∂mi( )/∂gi, and
∂ ˆ mi( )/∂b = (∂mi( )/∂G)K. Therefore, assumption (6) is equivalent to the as-
sumption that ˆ mi( ) is increasing in xi, decreasing in b, and weakly decreasing in
gi. Assume now that the claim ¯ g > ˜ g is not correct, i.e., that ¯ g ≤ ˜ g holds in equi-
librium. Because ¯ N/ ¯ K = ˜ N/ ˜ K, this implies ¯ b ≤ ˜ b. Since ˆ mi( ) is increasing in K
and decreasing in b, we thus have ¯ mi := ˆ mi(˜ xi,˜ gi,¯ b, ¯ K) > ˆ mi(˜ xi,˜ gi,˜ b, ˜ K) := ˜ mi.
Note that ˜ mi ≥ 1 holds for all types i ∈ Cv( ˜ N, ˜ N). Therefore, ¯ mi > 1 for all
i ∈ Cv( ˜ N, ˜ N), which in turn implies ¯ gi > ˜ gi, as long as 0 < ˜ gi < ωi, and ¯ gi = ˜ gi,
as long as ˜ gi = ωi. Because of assumption (7), we thus obtain ¯ g > ˜ g, which
23contradicts the initial claim ¯ g ≤ ˜ g. Hence, gv(N,N) is increasing in N.
Proof of Corollary 3
Because of ˜ aK(b1,...,bK) =
PK
k=1(1 − bk/z), we have aK(b,K) = K(1 − b/z),
aK(G/K,K) = K − G/z, and Ui(xi,gi,G,K) = ˜ Ui(xi,gi,K − G/z). Ac-
cordingly, Ui
G = ˜ Ui
a(−1/z), mi(xi,gi,G,K) = ˜ mi(xi,gi,aK(G/K,K))(−1/z),
and ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) = ˜ mi(xi,gi,aK(b,K))(−1/z), where ˜ mi(xi,gi,aK(b,K)) :=
(˜ Ui
a/(˜ Ui
x − ˜ Ui
g)). Hence, b and K aﬀect ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) only by means of the term
aK(b,K) = K(1 − b/z), which is decreasing in b and increasing in K. Since the
assumption ∂mi( )/∂G < 0 in (6) is equivalent to ∂ ˆ mi( )/∂b < 0, the functions
ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) are thus increasing in K. Due to Proposition 2, this implies that
gv(N,N) is increasing in N.
Consider now the Nash equilibrium in two economies with parameters ˜ N = ˜ K
and ¯ N = ¯ K = ˜ N + 1 respectively, and employ the same notation as in the proof
of Proposition 2. Because of ¯ g > ˜ g, we must have ¯ gj > ˜ gj for at least one
type j ∈ {1,...,I}. Due to the agents’ ﬁrst-order conditions (4), this can hold
only if ˆ mj(˜ xj, ˜ gj,¯ b, ¯ K) > ˆ mj(˜ xj, ˜ gj,˜ b, ˜ K). In the present example, this leads to
˜ mj(˜ xj,˜ gj,¯ a) > ˜ mj(˜ xj,˜ gj,˜ a), where ¯ a := a
¯ K(¯ b, ¯ K) and ˜ a := a
˜ K(˜ b, ˜ K). Since the
property ∂ ˆ mi( )/∂b < 0 implies that ˜ mi( ) is decreasing in aK(b,K), we thus
have ¯ a < ˜ a. Accordingly, ˆ mi(˜ xi,˜ gi,¯ b, ¯ K) > ˆ mi(˜ xi, ˜ gi,˜ b, ˜ K) holds for all types
i ∈ {1,...,I}. Using again the ﬁrst-order conditions (4), this implies ¯ gi ≥ ˜ gi for
all i. Therefore, cv( ¯ N, ¯ N) ≥ cv( ˜ N, ˜ N).
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider ﬁrst the individuals’ ﬁrst-order conditions mi(xi,gi,G,K) = pi in the
Lindahl equilibrium, where gi = piG and xi = ωi − gi. Because ∂mi( )/∂xi > 0,
∂mi( )/∂G < 0, and ∂mi( )/∂gi ≤ 0, these conditions imply that the de-
mand functions Gi(pi,ωi,K) are strictly decreasing in pi. For the same reason,
Gi(pi,ωi,K) is increasing in K, provided that mi(xi,gi,G,K) is increasing in K.





Since the functions Gi(pi,ωi,K) are strictly decreasing in pi, the equilibrium
conditions N(
PI
i=1 pi) = 1 and G1( ) = G2( ) = ... = GI( ) imply p∗
i(N +1,K) <
24p∗
i(N,K) for all types i = 1,...,I. Because of weak gross substitutability, we thus
have x∗
i(N + 1,K) ≤ x∗
i(N,K) for all i, which in turn implies g∗
i(N + 1,K) ≥
g∗
i(N,K). Accordingly, g∗(N + 1,K) ≥ g∗(N,K) holds as well.
(b) Consider the Lindahl equilibrium in two economies with parameters
˜ N = ˜ K and ¯ N = ¯ K = ˜ N + 1 respectively. In order to simplify the nota-
tion, deﬁne ˜ xi := x∗
i( ˜ N, ˜ N), ˜ gi := g∗
i( ˜ N, ˜ N), ˜ pi := p∗
i( ˜ N, ˜ N), ˜ G := G∗( ˜ N, ˜ N),
˜ g := g∗( ˜ N, ˜ N), and ˜ b := ˜ G/ ˜ K. The equilibrium prices ¯ pi and allocation
¯ xi,¯ gi, ¯ G, ¯ g,¯ b for the ¯ N- ¯ K-economy are deﬁned analogously. Note ﬁrst that the
deﬁnition ˆ mi(xi,gi,b,K) := mi(xi,gi,bK,K) = mi(xi,gi,G,K) and the assump-
tion ∂mi( )/∂G < 0 imply that ˆ mi( ) can be weakly increasing in K only if mi( )
is strictly increasing in K. Therefore, the functions Gi(pi,ωi,K) are increasing
in K and decreasing in pi for all types i (see above). Note also that the equi-
librium condition N
PI
i=1 pi(N,N) = 1 implies ¯ pi < ˜ pi for at least one type
i ∈ {1,...,I}. Therefore, we have ¯ G = Gi(¯ pi,ωi, ¯ K) > Gi(˜ pi,ωi, ˜ K) = ˜ G. In the
following, I will show that the property ¯ G > ˜ G implies ¯ g > ˜ g. For a proof of this
claim, assume otherwise, i.e., ¯ g ≤ ˜ g. This implies ¯ b ≤ ˜ b. Moreover, ¯ gj ≤ ˜ gj and
¯ xj ≥ ˜ xj must hold for at least some type j ∈ {1,...,I}. Because ˆ mj(xj,gj,b,K)
is weakly increasing in K, and because it is also increasing in xj, decreasing
in b, and weakly decreasing in gj (see the proof of Proposition 2), we thus ob-
tain ˆ mj(¯ xj,¯ gj,¯ b, ¯ K) ≥ ˆ mj(˜ xj,˜ gj,˜ b, ˜ K). Due to the agents’ ﬁrst-order conditions
ˆ mj( ) = mj( ) = pj( ) in the Lindahl equilibrium, this means ¯ pj ≥ ˜ pj. Because
¯ gj = ¯ pj ¯ G, ˜ gj = ˜ pj ˜ G, and ¯ gj ≤ ˜ gj, this implies ¯ G ≤ ˜ G - a contradiction. Therefore,
g∗(N,N) is increasing in N.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider ﬁrst the claim limN→∞ e(N,N) = 1. As argued in the main text, some
upper bound ¯ g ≤ ¯ ω exists with the properties g∗(N,N) ≤ ¯ g for all N ≥ 1 and
limN→∞ g∗(N,N) = ¯ g. Assume now that limN→∞ e(N,N) = 1 does not hold.
Because gv(N,N) is increasing in N (see Proposition 2), we can then ﬁnd some
real number γ < 1 such that gv(N,N) < γ¯ g for all N ≥ 1. Since g∗(N,N)
converges to ¯ g as N becomes large, there must exist some group size ˆ N = ˆ K
where ˆ g := g∗( ˆ N, ˆ N) ≥ γ¯ g. Let (ˆ xi,ˆ gi,ˆ b, ˆ G) denote the corresponding Lindahl
allocation. Because of the Samuelson condition (8), we have ˆ mi(ˆ xi,ˆ gi,ˆ b, ˆ K) ≤ 1
25for all types i. Using the assumption limK→∞ ˆ mi(ˆ xi,ˆ gi,ˆ b,K) > 1, we can thus
ﬁnd some number ˜ K > ˆ K, where ˆ mi(ˆ xi,ˆ gi,ˆ b, ˜ K) ≥ 1 holds for all i ∈ {1,...,I}.
Consider now an economy with size ˜ K = ˜ N. Then it follows immediately from the
ﬁrst-order conditions (4), assumption (6), and the property ˆ mi(ˆ xi, ˆ gi,ˆ b, ˜ K) ≥ 1,
i = 1,...,I that the average transfer ˜ b := Gv( ˜ N, ˜ N)/ ˜ K in the Nash equilibrium
cannot fall below ˆ b. Accordingly, we also have gv( ˜ N, ˜ N) ≥ ˆ g ≥ γ¯ g, which in
turn contradicts the claim that gv(N,N) < γ¯ g holds for all N ≥ 1. Therefore,
limN→∞ e(N,N) = 1. Next, note that the inequality e(N,N) < 1 must hold as
long as NI ≥ 2 (see fn. 18). Hence, e(2,2) < 1 = limN→∞ e(N,N), which implies
that e(N,N) is increasing in N at least for some N ≥ 1.
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